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DISEASE AS INDUSTRIAL INJURY
IN CALIFORNIA
Charles Lawrence Swezey*
The English Workmen's Compensation Act of 1906 specified
that a compensable harm must be either a physical injury by accident
or one of six listed industrial diseases.' Most of the early statutes in
the United States were limited expressly or by judicial interpretation
to accidental injury.2 Eventually coverage in all but three states was
extended to encompass occupational diseases. Some jurisdictions, in
the manner of the English act, schedule the specific occupational
diseases and frequently the industry covered. Nearly thirty now
provide for general coverage.8
California's first compulsory workmen's compensation act, en-
acted in 1913, allowed compensation only where an employee sus-
tained a personal injury by accident. Because the phrase "by acci-
dent" was thought to exclude occupational diseases, the law was
amended in 1915 to eliminate these words and to provide for
compensation for any injury arising out of and in the course of the
employment. The purpose of this amendment was to extend liability
coverage to diseases as well as traumatic injuries arising out of the
employment. 4
Two years later California became one of the first jurisdictions
to expressly cover disease in general terms when the Workmen's
Compensation Insurance and Safety Act of 1917 defined injury to
include "any disease arising out of the employment." ' This definition
now appears in Section 3208 of the California Labor Code. Disease
is also mentioned in three other Labor Code sections: Section 4663,
which provides that in the case of aggravation of a pre-existing
disease compensation is recoverable only for the portion of the
disability attributable to the aggravation; Section 5412, which de-
fines the date of injury in occupational disease cases; and Section
* A.B., 1943, Cornell University, Phi Beta Kappa; LL.B., 1948, Stanford Uni-
versity, Order of the Coif; Law Clerk, California Supreme Court, 1948-1950; Referee,
Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board.
1 6 Edw. 7, ch. 58, Schedule III.
2 Riesenfeld, Contemporary Trends in Compensation for Industrial Accidents, 42
CALIF. L. REv. 531, 541 (1954).
3 1 LARSON, WOR-cMEN'S COMPENSATION 593 (1961).
4 Slattery v. City and County of San Francisco, 6 I.A.C. 140 (1919).
5 Cal. Stat. 1917, ch. 586, § 3(4).
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5500.5, which sets forth the procedure for the trial of a claim for
occupational disease arising out of more than one employment.
Since Labor Code Section 3208 places injury and disease in the
disjunctive, it is reasonable to assume that the word disease is not
intended to include traumatic disturbances of bodily health. The
Labor Code, however, contains no definition of disease. The word
is commonly defined as "any illness or departure from health" or,
more specifically, "a particular destructive process in the body with
a specific cause and characteristic symptoms."6 A physician would
probably say that a disease is a "definite morbid process having a
characteristic train of symptoms which may affect the whole body
or any of its parts and the etiology, pathology and prognosis of
which may be known or unknown."'
. California compensation decisions use the term disease in at
least six different contexts: (1) occupational disease; (2) other dis-
ease arising out of employment; (3) aggravation of pre-existing
disease by employment conditions; (4) aggravation of pre-existing
disease by a specific incident of trauma; (5) disease as a proximate
result of traumatic injury; (6) injury caused by disease.
In each of the six categories the ultimate result under Cali-
fornia law is an award of compensation if the requisite facts are
established. The theory and factual requirements may, however,
vary depending upon how the disease contributes to the disability for
which compensation is claimed.
Exploration of the six types of cases reveals similarities from
which basic principles can be drawn and facilitates consideration of
certain special problems, which are not ordinarily encountered in an
uncomplicated traumatic injury case, such as apportionment and
ascertainment of the date of injury.
OCCUPATIONAL DISEASES
An appellate judge recently observed that "the term 'occupa-
tional disease' has not been defined either by the code or by authori-
tative judicial decision." 8 The same decision, however, cited Johnson
v. Industrial Accident Commission9 which described an occupational
disease as one in which the cumulative effect of exposure in the
employment environment ultimately results in manifest pathology
and which is "a natural incident of a particular occupation as dis-
6 WEBSTER, NEw 20TH CENTURY DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1966).
7 DORLAND, ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY (23d ed.).
8 Turudich v. I.A.C., 237 Cal. App. 2d 455, 47 Cal. Rptr. 21, 30 C.C.C. 316 (1965).
9 157 Cal. App. 2d 838, 321 P.2d 856, 23 C.C.C. 54 (1958).
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tinguished from and exceeding the hazard and risk of ordinary
employment."
Since disease arising out of the employment has nearly always
been compensable in California regardless of whether it is "occupa-
tional" or caused "by accident," the California courts have not had
cause to belabor definitions of occupational disease to the extent
other states have done so.' The California courts have, however,
recognized from the outset that diseases arising out of employment
fall into two classes: (1) industrial or occupational disease which
is the natural and expected result of a workman following a particu-
lar occupation for a considerable period of time, and (2) other
disease which is the result of some unusual condition of the em-
ployment."
Silicosis," wheat allergy,' 8 glass blowers' arm,'4 and lead poi-
soning 5 have been treated as occupational diseases by appellate
courts. Cancer caused by a blow,' 6 poliomyelitis from a single ex-
posure" and an injury to the back as the result of using a jackham-
mer on a specific date 8 have been held not to be occupational
diseases. The Industrial Accident Commission" has considered as-
bestosis,"° emphysema superimposed upon silicosis," lead poison-
ing," encephalitis lethargica, s8 dermatitis,24 undulant fever or bru-
10 Cf., 1 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 593 (1961).
11 San Francisco v. IA.C., 183 Cal. 273, 191 Pac. 26, 7 I.A.C. 108 (1920); Marsh
v. I.A.C., 217 Cal. 338, 18 P.2d 933, 19 I.A.C. 159, 163 (1933).
12 Marsh v. I.A.C., 217 Cal. 338, 18 P.2d 933, 19 I.A.C. 159 (1933).
13 Baker v. IA.C., 243 A.CA. 424, 52 Cal. Rptr. 276, 31 C.C.C. 228 (1966).
Asthma caused by the wheat allergy ultimately developed into disabling pulmonary
emphysema. The case was tried under LAB. CODE § 5500.5 which relates exclusively to
occupational diseases.
14 Blanchard v. IA.C., 68 Cal. App. 65, 228 Pac. 359, 11 I.A.C. 245 (1924).
15 Moore Shipbuilding Corp. v. I.C., 70 Cal. App. 495, 233 Pac. 392, 12 I.A.C.
283 (1925).
16 United States Cas. Co. v. I.A.C., 122 Cal. App. 2d 427, 265 P.2d 35, 19 C.C.C.
8 (1954).
17 Johnson v. I.A.C., 157 Cal. App. 2d 838, 321 P.2d 856, 23 C.C.C. 54 (1958).
18 Turudich v. I.A.C., 237 Cal. App. 2d 455, 47 Cal. Rptr. 21, 30 C.C.C. 316
(1965).
19 Effective January 15, 1966, the judicial function of the Industrial Accident
Commission became vested in the Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board, CAL. LAB.
CODE § 11.
20 Hofer v. I.A.C., 4 C.C.C. 32 (1939); Pacific Emp. Ins. Co. v. I.A.C., 13 C.C.C.
197 (1948) ; see note 36 infra for discussion of effect of denial of a writ of review.
21 California Cas. Ind. Exch. v. I.A.C., 31 C.C.C. 135 (1966).
22 Hess v. Cooperative Battery Co., 15 I.A.C. 19 (1928); Pacific Beter Works v.
I.A.C., 5 C.C.C. 192 (1940).
23 A progressive disease of the central nervous system found in this case to result
from exposure to chemicals used by a dyer. Van Dusen v. Standard Dyers & Finishers,
Inc., 6 C.C.C. 66 (1941).
24 Pacific Emp. Ins. Co. v. I.A.C., 5 C.C.C. 188 (1940), where it was caused by
exposure to solvents used by a painter. Quaere: If the offending agent is not peculiar
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cellosis,25 giant emphysematous bullae,26 berylliosis2 7 and hearing
loss28 as occupational diseases. An early case even held a policeman's
flat feet, which developed over a five-year period, to be an occupa-
tional disease since his employment especially exposed him to the
danger of such injury.2" Wood alcohol poisoning, ° ulcers8 and
ruptured intervertebral discs82 have been determined not to be
occupational diseases.
The Industrial Accident Commission has vacillated on the ques-
tion of whether tuberculosis is an occupational disease. It initially
held that since tuberculosis was due to an infection at a specific time,
it was more analogous to an accident than an occupational disease
"which appears as the result of accumulated exposure."8" In Layden
v. Industrial Indemnity Company,84 however, a panel of three com-
missioners held tuberculosis resulting from an exposure to a fellow
employee over a period of four years to be an occupational disease.
Relying on some pre 1917 cases which confused the terms "occupa-
tional disease" and "disease arising out of the employment," 5 they
concluded that an occupational disease did not have to be peculiar
to the occupation in which the injured workman was employed. For
reasons which do not appear in the official reports, the Layden case
was not appealed." Most recently, the Commission returned to the
to the occupation, should dermatitis be treated as an occupational disease? As a general
rule, each outbreak of dermatitis is treated as a separate injury and the employer
during the period of treatment required to clear up the outbreak. Cerelli v. State Comp.
Ins. Fund, 17 I.A.C. 18 (1930). No permanent disability is found unless the employ-
ment, as opposed to a personal idiosyncrasy, caused the sensitivity. Richie v. IA.C.,
22 C.C.C. 80 (1957).
25 Brown v. Cudahy Packing Co., 5 C.C.C. 197 (1940).
26 Union Lumber Co. v. I.A.C., 16 C.C.C. 255 (1951), where it was contracted
by a saw mill worker as the result of exposure to dust coupled with strenuous physical
labor.
27 Pacific Emp. Ins. Co. v. I.A.C., 15 C.C.C. 281 (1950), where the employee was
a neon tube bender and worked with beryllium.
28 Halyaman v. Calif. Cas. Ind. Exch., 24 C.C.C. 232 (1959); Messner v. I.A.C.,
27 C.C.C. 226 (1962); Kaiser Steel Corp. v. I.A.C., 28 C.C.C. 175 (1963); Argonaut
Ins. Co. v. I.A.C., 29 C.C.C. 390 (1964).
29 Hedden v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 5 IA.C. 1 (1918).
80 De Witt v. Jacoby Bros., 1 I.A.C. 170 (1914), where the commissioners relied
upon the fact that wood alcohol poisoning was not on a list of 20 or 25 generally
recognized occupational diseases.
81 Pedrotti v. IA.C., 30 C.C.C. 305 (1965).
82 White v. I.A.C., 16 C.C.C. 207 (1951); Jenkins v. I.A.C., 29 C.C.C. 126 (1964),
where the disc injury was the result of repeated jarring of a bus driver.
88 Asdel v. County of Los Angeles, 4 C.C.C. 161 (1939).
84 25 C.C.C. 40 (1959).
85 E.g., Adams v. California, 4 I.A.C. 62 (1917).
86 Judicial review of decisions of the Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board
(formerly Industrial Accident Commission) is effected by means of a writ of review.
Since this is a prerogative writ, the court has discretion to deny it without a hearing
or opinion and the parties have no way of knowing the reason for the denial. It
is generally considered, however, that a case in which a writ has been denied is somewhat
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position that an occupational disease must be incurred in an industry
or occupational situation which is productive of an uncommon
amount of the disease or which routinely constitutes a special haz-
ard.87
Dorland's Medical Dictionary defines occupational disease
simply as a disease caused by one's employment. 8 It is perhaps
regrettable that the Commission did not persist in its use of this
simple definition. Adoption of such a definition, however, would
require either legislative action or the ignoring of a substantial body
of judicial authority, since the courts have rather consistently as-
sumed that occupational diseases have certain distinguishing charac-
teristics. Among them are: (1) gradual development although the
rate of progress may vary89; (2) usually a continual absorption of
deleterious substances40 ; (3) continuous exposure to a particular
work situation finally causing physical breakdown41 ; (4) disease not
previously existing but building up over a period of time42; (5) nat-
ural and reasonably to be expected results of following a particular
occupation for a considerable period of time4"; (6) first and early
stages not always perceptible44 ; (7) peculiarity to a given occupa-
tion4 ; (8) latency and progressive development.46
One authority in the field of workmen's compensation has indi-
cated that it is probably misleading to quote indiscriminately from
the old decisions, but he notes that one common element running
through all the definitions is a distinctive relation to the nature of
the employment. Larson suggests that occupational disease should
be defined to include any disease arising out of exposure to harmful
employment conditions which are present in a peculiar or increased
better authority than a referee or board decision from which no review was sought.
Cf. Messner v. I.A.C., 216 Cal. App. 2d 536, 30 Cal. Rptr. 898, 28 C.C.C. 115 (1963),
where the court said that "denial without opinion of an application for a prerogative
writ (except habeas corpus) is not res judicata of the issues presented by the applica-
tion unless the sole possible ground of denial was that the court acted on the merits,
or unless it affirmatively appears that such denial was intended to be on the merits."
The referee's decision in the Layden case was extensively quoted, but without particular
application, in Argonaut Ins. Co. v. I.A.C., 231 Cal. App. 2d 111, 41 Cal. Rptr. 628, 29
C.C.C. 279 (1964).
837 Pedrotti v. I.A.C., 30 C.C.C. 305 (1965).
98 DoRLAND, ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY (23d ed. 1957).
59 Marsh v. I.A.C., 217 Cal. 338, 18 P.2d 933, 19 I.A.C. 159 (1933).
40 Argonaut Mining Co. v. I.A.C., 21 Cal. App. 2d 492, 70 P.2d 216, 2 C.C.C. 130
(1937).
41 Argonaut Ins. Co. v. I.A.C., 231 Cal. App. 2d 111, 41 Cal. Rptr. 628, 29 C.C.C.
279 (1964).
42 Colonial Ins. Co. v. I.A.C., 29 Cal. 2d 79, 172 P.2d 884, 11 C.C.C. 226 (1945).
43 San Francisco v. I.A.C., 183 Cal. 273, 191 Pac. 26, 7 I.A.C. 108 (1920).
44 Marsh v. I.A.C., 217 Cal. 338, 18 P.2d 933, 19 I.A.C. 59 (1933).
45 Johnson v. I.A.C., 157 Cal. App. 2d 838, 321 P.2d 856, 23 C.C.C. 54 (1958).
46 Marsh v. I.A.C., 217 Cal. 338, 18 P.2d 933, 19 I.A.C. 59 (1933).
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degree not present in other occupations or every day life. He ob-
serves that length of exposure is gradually being disregarded as an
essential element of an occupational disease." While Larson's defi-
nition would probably not square with the language in some of the
California decisions, its application to the various fact situations
presented by the cases would not affect the ultimate results.
Radiation sickness, which has been a matter of much public
concern in recent years, would undoubtedly be considered to be an
occupational disease unless the exposure is patent and consists of a
single episode. California authority on the subject is sparse. 8
OTHER DISEASES ARISING OUT OF EMPLOYMENT
Diseases other than occupational diseases are said to arise out
of the employment when they result from some unusual condition
of the employment. Compensation is not payable, however, merely
because the disease is contracted during the employment. There
must be a cause and effect relationship between the employment and
the disease. The employee's risk of contracting the disease must, be-
cause of his employment, be materially greater than that of the
general public.4 9
This risk may be the risk of exposure to a contagious disease
carried by a pupil of a school teacher,5" a patient of a hospital em-
ployee51 or even a fellow employee in any industry. 2 Sometimes the
increased exposure is the result of conditions of the employment such
as poison oak,5" drafts,54 impure drinking water55 or ring worm on
47 1 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 593 (1961).
48 See, e.g., Michel v. I.A.C., 22 C.C.C. 72 (1957). For an exhaustive treatment of
one phase of the problem see Estep and Allen, Radiation Injuries and Time Limitations
in Workmen's Compensation Cases, 62 MIcH. L. REv. 259 (1963).
49 Bethlehem Steel Co. v. I.A.C., 21 Cal. 2d 742, 135 P.2d 153, 8 C.C.C. 61 (1943),
and cases cited. In the case of certain public safety officials there are statutory re-
buttable presumptions that certain diseases (hernia, pneumonia, tuberculosis and heart
trouble) manifesting themselves while the official is in service arise out of the employ-
ment. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 3212-3212.7.
50 San Francisco v. Connolly, 20 I.A.C. 31 (1934).
51 Argonaut Ins. Co. v. I.A.C., 25 C.C.C. 65 (1960), where a nurse contracted
infectious hepatitis; San Francisco v. I.A.C., 183 Cal. 273, 191 Pac. 26, 7 I.A.C. 108
(1920), where an attendant contracted influenza; Engels Copper Mining Co. v. I.A.C.,
183 Cal. 714, 192 Pac. 845, 7 I.A.C. 144 (1920).
52 State Comp. Ins. Fund v. I.A.C., 22 C.C.C. 189 (1957).
53 Mandlebaum v. San Francisco, 9 I.A.C. 122 (1922); see also Adzima v.
Maryland Cas. Co., 18 I.A.C. 79 (1932), where a sheepherder was bitten by ticks and
came down with spotted fever.
54 Terry v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 11 I.A.C. 136 (1924), where exposure to
drafts caused Bell's palsy in the case of a Y.M.C.A. hostess.
55 Pacific Ind. Co. v. I.A.C., 6 C.C.C. 36 (1941); paratyphoid fever; Federal
Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. I.A.C., 16 I.A.C. 48 (1929), typhoid fever.
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the floor of a gentlemen's club.56 Other times the special exposure
results when the employee is sent to an area where there is an
epidemic or endemic disease to which he has no resistance, such as
malaria, San Joaquin Valley fever or dysentary.5 7 The epidemic may
even be in the employer's plant.5 8 If illness results from a vaccination
or inoculation requested by the employer, the illness arises out of the
employment.59
AGGRAVATION OF PRE-EXISTING DISEASE
BY EMPLOYMENT CONDITIONS
The maxim that "Industry takes the employee as he is at the
time of his employment" is applied to hold the employer liable for
industrially caused aggravation of an employee's pre-existing dis-
ease. Such an aggravation or acceleration of the pre-existing disease
is considered an injury arising out of the employment.6"
A disease, however, which under normal working conditions is
likely to progress so as finally to disable the employee does not be-
come an injury merely because it reaches the point of disability
while the employee is working. It is only when there is a direct
causal connection between the conditions of the employment and the
disability that an award of compensation can be made. 6' In each case
it must be determined whether the disability resulted exclusively
from the diseased condition or whether the employment was a proxi-
mate cause. If the proximate and immediate cause of the disability
is the underlying disease, there is no recovery, even though the dis-
ability manifests itself in the course of the employment.62 If, on the
56 Barnett v. London Guar. & Acc. Co., 19 I.A.C. 71 (1933); see also Lutjens
v. Fid. & Cas. Co., 13 I.A.C. 75 (1926), where a butcher tasted sausage infected with
trichinae and Williams v. Pac. Emp. Ins. Co., 4 C.C.C. 123 (1939) where the employee
contracted impetigo from a telephone infected by a customer.
57 Hoback v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 5 C.C.C. 104 (1940), malaria by pipe
layer in South American jungle; Biscailuz v. County of Los Angeles, 11 I.A.C. 121
(1924), tropical fever by a special deputy sent to Central America to bring back the
notorious murderess, Clara Phillips; Pacific Emp. Ins. Co. v. I.A.C., 19 Cal. 2d 622,
122 P.2d 570, 7 C.C.C. 71 (1942), valley fever; Levine v. Los Angeles Examiner, 13
I.A.C. 123 (1926), dysentery by a reporter sent to interior of Central America;
Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. I.A.C., 84 Cal. App. 506, 258 Pac. 698, 14 I.A.C. 228 (1927),
typhoid while traveling in a foreign country; but see Pattiani v. I.A.C., 199 Cal.
596, 250 Pac. 864, 13 I.A.C. 219 (1926), where it was held that the risk of contracting
typhoid fever from eating oysters in New York City was not greater than that of the
general public.
58 Bethlehem Steel Co. v. I.A.C., 21 Cal. 2d 742, 135 P.2d 153, 8 C.C.C. 61 (194).
59 Roberts v. U.S.O. Camp Shows, Inc., 91 Cal. App. 2d 884, 205 P.2d 1116, 14
C.C.C. 136 (1949).
60 Beveridge v. I.A.C., 175 Cal. App. 2d 592, 346 P.2d 545, 24 C.C.C. 274 (1959).




other hand, the disability is due entirely to the lighting up or ag-
gravation of the pre-existing condition by the employment, the
employer is required to compensate the employee for the entire dis-
ability.6"
The leading case illustrating this type of injury is Fireman's
Fund Indemnity Company v. Industrial Accident Commission6 4
where a representative of an employers' association suffered a stroke
as a result of the strain and tension of 65 days of contract negotia-
tions with certain labor unions. The medical testimony, although
conflicting, established that the long hours of work and the tense
conditions which surrounded them aggravated his pre-existing hyper-
tension and precipitated a stroke. The award was based upon the
rule that where an employee suffers disability brought on by strain
and overexertion incident to his employment, there is a compensable
injury even though the underlying disease previously existed and
there is no traumatic injury. 5
The same rule has been applied in a case of tuberculosis re-
activated by weather and pressure changes and strenuous employ-
ment activity,66 and aggravation of a pre-existing heart condition
into disability as the result of dumping 150 heavy sacks of peanuts
every day, six days a week."7
A chronic disease now more prevalent than lung cancer and
tuberculosis combined is pulmonary emphysema, an insidious and
progressive lung disease of unknown etiology. Second only to heart
disease as a cause of disability in workers from 50 to 64 years of
age, it is subject to aggravation by exposure to respiratory irritants.
When such irritants are inhaled because of employment conditions,
any resulting disability is compensable to the extent of the aggrava-
tion.6"
63 Tanenbaum v. I.A.C., 4 Cal. 2d 615, 52 P.2d 215, 20 I.A.C. 390 (1935).
64 39 Cal. 2d 831, 250 P.2d 148, 17 C.C.C. 289 (1952).
65 Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. I.A.C., 29 Cal. 2d 492, 496, 175 P.2d 823, 11
C.C.C. 289 (1946).
66 Pacific Ind. Co. v. I.A.C., 34 Cal. 2d 726, 214 P.2d 530, 15 C.C.C. 37 (1950).
67 Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. I.A.C., 73 Cal. App. 2d 555, 166 P.2d 908, 11 C.G.C.
66 (1946), which contains an excellent analysis of all of the heart cases decided prior
to 1946. Heart claims are almost always contested and are the subject of much
controversy among labor, industry, insurance, legislative, medical and legal groups.
There is no sound legal reason, however, why the heart should be treated any differently
than any other organ impaired by an industrial injury. Volumes of material have
already been written on the subect, and it will not be given any special treatment here.
See Beard, Heart Disease Claims under the California Workmen's Compensation Act,
13 CIRCULATION 448 (1956), and Larson, The Heart Cases in Workmen's Compensation,
65 MicH. L. REv. 441 (1967).
68 Johnson, Emphysema and Employment, ABA SEc. INs., NEG. & ComP. LAW,
§ 132 (1965). United States Lime Products v. I.A.C., 29 C.C.C. 253 (1964); Masonite
Corp. v. I.A.C., 30 C.C.C. 88 (1965).
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There is a familial tendency to emphysema and a statistical
correlation between the disease and cigarette smoking. It may de-
velop from allergic asthma. 9 If the allergic asthma is an occupa-
tional disease, the resulting emphysema should probably be treated
as a proximate result of the occupational disease.7"
AGGRAVATION OF DISEASE BY SPECIFIC INCIDENTS OF TRAUMA
The rule that the employer takes the employee subject to his
condition when he enters the employment also applies where a
specific traumatic episode lights up or aggravates a previously exist-
ing disease rendering it disabling. Again, liability for the full dis-
ability is imposed upon the employer even though the incident would
have had little or no effect on a more healthy individual. Examples of
this type of disease are reactivation of latent tuberculosis by an
employment connected assault,7 ' the lighting up of a latent leutic
condition by an injury,72 a myocardial infarction resulting from
lifting a 12 foot roll of linoleum, 7 the fracture by a lifting strain of
a hip so weakened by Paget's disease that a spontaneous fracture
could be expected at any time,74 and the aggravation of a schizoid
personality into moderate schizophrenia by an injury which caused
the loss of an eye.75
DISEASE AS A PROXIMATE RESULT OF TRAUMATIC INJURY
Frequently a traumatic injury will be complicated by a disease
process which did not previously exist. If the disease which develops
subsequent to the injury is a proximate result thereof, it is obviously
compensable since the employer is liable for all disability and medi-
cal treatment proximately resulting from an industrial injury. Lock-
69 Testimony of Glen Lillington, M.D. in Patterson v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co.,
Case No. 65 SJ 16496 (1967). See also, ABA, SECTION ON INSURANCE, NEGLICENCE AND
COMPENSATION LAW 132 (1965).
70 See note 13 supra.
71 Mullane v. I.A.C., 118 C.A. 283, 5 P.2d 483, 17 I.A.C. 328 (1931).
72 Los Angeles v. I.A.C., 20 I.A.C. 102 (1934).
73 Casualty Ins. Co. v. I.A.C., 23 C.C.C. 185 (1958) ; see note 67, supra.
74 State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Roberts, 8 C.C.C. 117 (1942).
75 Subsequent Injuries Fund v. I.A.C., 53 Cal. 2d 392, 348 P.2d 193, 25 C.C.C.
10 (1960). Mental and emotional diseases arising out of the employment are as
compensable as physical diseases. And exhaustive exploration of this type of disease is
beyond the scope of the article, but, in general, the same rules apply. Difficulty,
however, arises when the language of the physical injury decisions is used loosely in
cases involving psychoneuroses. Here lawyers and psychiatrists often fail to dif-
ferentiate the situation where an injury actually aggravates or precipitates a neurosis
from that where the injury merely provides a convenient focus for existing anxieties.
Cf. Tolerico v. I.A.C., 24 C.C.C. 264 (1959); Pineda v. I.A.C., 30 C.C.C. 74 (1965);
Cooper v. I.A.C., 30 C.C.C. 128 (1965).
SANTA CLARA LAWYER
jaw from stepping on a rusty nail,7" gonorrheal infection 7 or shin-
gles 78 entering the system through an eye abrasion and mental
deterioration from a blow on the head 79 are examples of this type of
disease. The injury may also cause such a lowered resistance to
infection that a subsequent infection is considered a proximate re-
sult of the injury.8"
INJURIES CAUSED BY DISEASE
As mentioned above, a purely idiopathic illness which has no
relation to the employment does not constitute an industrial injury
even though it occurs in the course of the employment. In the early
history of workmen's compensation in California, the Supreme Court
applied this rule to the case of a workman who had an epileptic fit
and fell 39 feet to the ground from a scaffold sustaining fatal
injuries.81 In later cases this harsh holding was modified, and it was
decided that if some factor peculiar to the employment contributed
to the injury, it arose out of the employment even though it had its
origin solely in some idiopathy of the employee. Thus, it was held in
National Automobile & Casualty Insurance Company v. Industrial
Accident Commission 2 that a skull fracture suffered by an electri-
cian during an epileptic seizure which caused him to strike his head
against a saw horse was compensable. The saw horse was considered
a special risk of the employment which contributed to the injury.
Finally, in Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Company of Wis-
consin v. Industrial Accident Commission,8 8 the Supreme Court re-
jected the argument that it was necessary in idiopathic seizure cases
for the fall to be from a height or against some object to establish a
causal relationship between the employment and the injury.84 justice
Carter, writing for a bare majority, pointed out that the causal
connection between the employment and injury need only be con-
tributory and that he could see no distinction between the idiopathic
seizure cases and those in which an employee fell because of his own
carelessness or innate awkwardness.
Although epileptic seizure cases are perhaps the most dramatic,
the rules announced therein are equally applicable to the case of a
truck driver who has a fainting spell and is injured when his truck
76 Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. I.A.C., 17 I.A.C. 147 (1930).
77 Kelly v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 19 I.A.C. 55 (1933).
78 Guarantee Ins. Co. v. I.A.C., 20 C.C.C. 189 (1955).
79 Pacific Ind. Ins. Co. v. I.A.C., 23 C.C.C. 130 (1958). See note 75, supra.
80 Royal Ind. Co. v. I.A.C., 16 C.C.C. 3 (1951).
81 Brooker v. I.A.C., 176 Cal. 275, 168 Pac. 126, 4 I.A.C. 311 (1917).
82 75 Cal. App. 2d 677, 171 P.2d 594, 11 C.C.C. 206 (1946).
88 41 Cal. 2d 676, 263 P.2d 4, 18 C.C.C. 286 (1953).
84 See 5 HASTINS L.J. 266 (1954).
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goes off the road, or to the case of a telephone repairman who has a
heart attack on top of a pole and falls off sustaining fatal injuries.85
CUMULATIVE INJURIES
Although they are beyond the scope of this article, some
mention should be made of the "continuous cumulative" or "repeti-
tive trauma" injuries, as it is frequently difficult to distinguish them
from occupational diseases and aggravation of pre-existing diseases.
This type of injury has long been recognized in California,"6 but
experienced a renaissance in Beveridge v. Industrial Accident Com-
mission.7 In these cases the cumulative effect of a succession of
slight or microtraumatic injuries, which individually are not dis-
abling, ultimately results in disability. Thus, a car loader may, as
a result of constant bending and heavy lifting over a period of years,
cause the breakdown of an intervertebral disc, or a cabinet maker
may develop an elbow inflammation from repetitive sanding. Justice
Tobriner eloquently described the process as follows:
We think the proposition irrefutable that while a succession of
slight injuries in the course of employment may not in themselves be
disabling, their cumulative effect in work effort may become a destruc-
tive force. The fact that a single but slight work strain may not be
disabling does not destroy its causative effect, if in combination with
other such strains, it produces a subsequent disability. The single
strand, entwined with others, makes up the rope of causation.88
One California authority has observed that repetitive injuries
can only be distinguished from occupational diseases by the type of
pathology involved. 9 Such a distinction provides the only reasonable
way of explaining why a hearing loss resulting from the repetitive
trauma of sound waves beating on the ear drums is an occupational
disease"° while a ruptured disc resulting from constant and repeti-
tive jarring of the spine is not."
DATE OF INJURY
When the injury consists of or flows from a specific traumatic
episode, the date of the incident is the date of injury. When dealing
85 Pacific Tel. and Tel. Co. v. I.A.C., 19 I.A.C. 106 (1933).
86 E.g., Searle v. Bay Cities Transp. Co., 20 I.A.C. 42 (1934); Grigsby v. State
Comp. Ins. Fund, 7 I.A.C. 187 (1920), where the Commission likened a hernia
resulting from continual heavy lifting to an occupational disease.
87 175 Cal. App. 2d 592, 346 P.2d 545, 24 C.C.C. 274 (1959).
88 Id. at 594, 346 P.2d at 547, 24 C.C.C. at 276.
89 2 HANNA, EMPLOYEE INJURIES & WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 134 (1954).
90 See note 28 supra.
91 See note 19 supra.
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with occupational diseases, contagious diseases with delayed periods
of incubation, aggravation of pre-existing disease by employment
conditions and cumulative injuries, no specific date can be readily
fixed as the date of injury. 2 Ascertainment of the date of injury can
be critical in a given case since it affects the time within which the
action must be filed, the amount and nature of the compensation
payable and the jurisdiction of the Workmen's Compensation Ap-
peals Board. 8
The law in force at the time of injury is applied to determine
the measure of recovery. 4 If an employee sustains a traumatic
injury on a certain date, he is entitled to compensation at the rate
provided by the law in effect on that date, but a problem arises in
disease cases when a change in the law becomes effective between
the date of exposure and the date of disability.95 Temporary dis-
ability indemnity is payable only during the five years immediately
following the injury, 6 and the Workmen's Compensation Appeals
Board loses jurisdiction to amend, alter or rescind its awards if a
petition for such relief is not filed within five years from the date of
injury. 7
California courts initially considered that regardless of date of
exposure to a disease, the employee had no cause of action and no
rights accrued to him until that point in time when the disease re-
sulted in a compensable disability. In Marsh v. Industrial Accident
Commission"s the Supreme Court announced that the date of injury
should be deemed to be
... the time when the accumulated effects culminate in a disability
traceable to the latent disease as the primary cause, and by the
exercise of reasonable care and diligence it is discoverable and apparent
that a compensable injury was sustained in the performance of the
duties of the employment.99
Following this decision, it was generally considered that the date of
injury in all cases was the date on which disability and knowledge
that the disability was caused by the employment coincided.
In 1947 the following sections were added to the Labor Code:
92 Association Ind. Corp. v. I.A.C., 124 Cal. App. 378, 12 P.2d 1075, 18 I.A.C.
203 (1932).
93 See note 19 supra.
94 Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. I.A.C., 30 Cal. 2d 388, 182 P.2d 159, 12 C.C.C.
123 (1947).
95 Association Ind. Co. v. I.A.C., 9 C.C.C. 244 (1944), which was decided prior
to the adoption of LAB. CODE §§ 5411-12.
96 CAL. LAB. CODE § 4656.
97 CAL. LAB. CODE § 5804.
98 217 Cal. 338, 18 P.2d 933, 19 I.A.C. 159 (1933).
99 Id. at 351, 18 P.2d at 938, 19 I.A.C. at -.
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5411. The date of injury, except in cases of occupational disease,
is that date during the employment on which occurred the alleged
incident or exposure, for the consequences of which compensation is
claimed.
5412. The date of injury in cases of occupational diseases is that
date upon which the employee first suffered disability therefrom and
either knew, or in exercise of reasonable diligence should have known,
that said disability was caused by his present or prior employment.
Since 1947, therefore, the date of injury in occupational disease
cases has been different from the date of injury in other disease
cases. In the latter cases, the date of injury is the last date of
exposure, whether the exposure be to a contagious disease'00 or em-
ployment strains.' Concern has been expressed that application of
Section 5411 to disease and repetitive trauma cases may result in
the loss of a right before it accrues if the disability does not manifest
itself until more than a year after the last exposure.0 2 It was
apparently this fear which motivated the Industrial Accident Com-
mission to attempt to broaden the definition of occupational disease
in the case of Layden v. Industrial Indemnity Co.05 which was dis-
cussed above. In most cases, however, the last exposure and the first
disability are sufficiently contemporaneous that no serious problem
arises.1o'
Establishment of the date of injury in occupational disease
cases involves the factual issue of knowledge of the employee that
his disability is employment connected, and the legal issue of what
constitutes "disability." A problem frequently arises in hearing loss
cases where an employee in a noisy work environment becomes
aware of a progressive hearing loss which he suspects is being caused
by the noise of the employment. If his hearing were to be tested, his
hearing loss might be sufficient to entitle him to a permanent dis-
ability rating,' but he is able to continue working without impair-
100 Johnson v. I.A.C., 157 Cal. App. 2d 838, 321 P.2d 856, 23 C.C.C. 54 (1958).
101 Fireman's Fund Ind. Co. v. I.4.C., 39 Cal. 2d 831, 250 P.2d 148, 17 C.C.C.
289 (1952).
102 CALIFORNIA CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, CALIFORNIA WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION PRACTICE 129 (1963). The Statute of Limitations for filing an applica-
tion for hearing before the Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board is one year if no
benefits have been furnished. CAL. LAB. CODE § 5405.
108 25 C.C.C. 40 (1960).
104 State Comp. Ins. Fund v. I.A.C., 20 C.C.C. 184 (1964); Argonaut Ins. Co. v.
I.A.C., 231 Cal. App. 2d 111, 41 Cal. Rptr. 628, 29 C.C.C. 279 (1964) which contain
dicta, contrary to the clear wording of CAL. LAB. CODE § 5411, to the effect that the
date of injury in repetitive trauma cases is the first date of disability. In each case,
however, the last exposure immediately preceded the first day of disability.
105 CALIFORNIA CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, CALIFORNIA WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION PRACTICE 535 (1963). A scheduled permanent disability for rating
purposes may be different from the actual disability insofar as productive work is
concerned. Smith v. IA.C., 44 Cal. 2d 364, 282 P.2d 64, 20 C.C.C. 82 (1955).
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ment of function or loss in wages. In this situation the Industrial
Accident Commission has defined disability as either an actual loss
in earning power or a limitation on the performance of his duties. 6
or as an actual "incapacity to pursue his regular job."'0°
It would seem that the foregoing definitions applied to a case
in which the employee knows he has had a sufficient industrial
hearing loss to qualify for permanent disability indemnity for longer
than one year would go beyond the language of Marsh v. Industrial
Accident Commission'"8 since the employee would have sustained
a "compensable injury" when he first became entitled to permanent
disability indemnity.' 09 The answer may be that because the hearing
loss is progressive, the injury does not become "permanent and
stationary" until the exposure ceases."'
It is interesting to observe that the word "disability" as used in
Labor Code sections 4751 and 4658 has been held not to require an
actual loss of earnings."' The Commission, moreover, has taken the
position that, for the purpose of Section 4751, disability includes
prospective loss of earning power and does not necessarily require
actual work disability or loss of earnings." 2 The seeming inconsis-
tency can be explained by the requirement in each case that the
sections involved be "liberally construed . . . with the purpose of
extending their benefits for the protection of persons injured .... MIS
APPORTIONMENT
Although, as has been seen above, the employer incurs liability
whenever the employment causes or aggravates a disease, it does not
necessarily follow that an employee's entire disability is the re-
sponsibility of the employer. Labor Code Section 4663 provides
that compensation shall be allowed only for such portion of disability
106 Argonaut Ins. Co. v. I.A.C., 29 C.C.C. 390 (1964).
107 Kaiser Steel Corp. v. I.A.C., 28 C.C.C. 175 (1963).
108 217 Cal. 338, 18 P.2d 933, 19 I.A.C. 159 (1933).
109 At the time the Marsh case was decided, CAL. LAB. CODE § 4661 provided:
"Where an injury causes both temporary and permanent disability, the injured
employee is not entitled to both a temporary and permanent disability payment, but
only to the greater of the two." Sec. 4661 now allows full compensation for both.
110 Permanent disability indemnity is not ordinarily payable until the disability
is stationary. CALIFORNIA CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, CALIFORNIA WORK-
MEN'S COMPENSATION PRACTICE 532-33 (1963). In any event, see Williams v. IA.C.,
71 Cal. App. 2d 136, 161 P.2d 979, 10 C.C.C. 267, 271 (1945), where the court said
that whether the Statute of Limitations starts running only when the impairment
of earnings is of such a substantial character that a man of ordinary prudence would
seek compensation was still an open question in this state.
"II Ferguson v. I.A.C., 50 Cal. 2d 469, 326 P.2d 145, 23 C.C.C. 108, 112 (1958);
State Comp. Ins. Fund v. I.C., 59 Cal. 2d 45, 27 Cal. Rptr. 702, 377 P.2d 902, 28
C.C.C. 20, 24 (1963).
112 Subsequent Injuries Fund v. I.A.C., 30 C.C.C. 258 (1965).
118 CAL. LAB. CODE § 3202.
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due to the aggravation of a prior disease as can be reasonably at-
tributed to the injury. Labor Code Section 4750 provides that an
employer is not liable for any permanent disability or physical
impairment which existed before the injury. If, however, the em-
ployee's disability is due entirely to the lighting up or aggravation of
a pre-existing condition by the industrial injury, the employer is
required to compensate for the entire disability, and there can be no
apportionment between the extent of the disability due to the injury
itself and that due to the contribution of the pre-existing disease." 4
If, on the other hand, the resultant disability consists partly of dis-
ability growing out of the injury (including the lighting up or
aggravation of pre-existing disease) and partly of disability result-
ing from the normal progress of a pre-existing disease apart from
the effects of the injury, the Workmen's Compensation Appeals
Board must make an apportionment.""
Application of these principles is well illustrated by the facts
in the case of Mary M. Harris"' who had suffered from tuberculosis
of the spine since childhood. Although her spine had been fused and
she had marked disability, she was able to obtain employment as a
sales clerk with Goodwill Industries, a corporation employing physi-
cally handicapped persons. In the course of her employment she fell
from a step-ladder and struck her right hip. The injury aggravated
her pre-existing quiescent tuberculosis, and she became totally dis-
abled. Since the temporary disability and the immediate need for
medical treatment was the result of the fall and its aggravating
effects on her pre-existing disease, the employer's insurance carrier
was held liable for the entire amount.
When the healing period was over and the injury became perma-
nent and stationary, she was left with permanent disability consisting
of the following: (1) the pre-existing disability; (2) any disability
resulting from normal progress of the disease apart from the effects
of the injury; (3) the disability directly attributable to the fall,
and (4) the disability caused by the injury's aggravation of the pre-
existing disease. The employer's insurance carrier was not liable for
the first"7 and second"' disabilities, but was for the third and
fourth." 9
114 Tanenbaum v. I.A.C., 4 Cal. 2d 615, 52 P.2d 215, 20 I.A.C. 390 (1935).
115 Bowler v. I.A.C., 135 Cal. App. 2d 534, 287 P.2d 562, 20 C.C.C. 217 (1955).
116 Goodwill Indus. v. IA.C., 114 Cal. App. 2d 452, 250 P.2d 627, 17 C.CC.
294 (1952); Subsequent Injuries Fund v. I.A.C., 44 Cal. 2d 604, 283 P.2d 1039, 20
C.C.C. 114 (1955).
117 CAL. LAB. CODE § 4750.
118 CAL. LAB. CODE § 4663. In the actual Harris cases the extent of disability
due to the normal pregression of the pre-existing disease, if any, was apparently over-
looked. The subject is fully and accurately discussed in Subsequent Injuries Fund v.
I.A.C., 135 Cal. App. 2d 544, 288 P.2d -31, 20 C.C.C. 230 (1955) which is analogous.
119 Tanenbaum v. I.A.C., 4 Cal. 2d 615, 52 P.2d 215, 20 I.A.C. 390 (1935).
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Where the employee dies as a result of his injury, there is no
apportionment, and the employer is liable for the entire death benefit
even though the pre-existing disease would eventually have been
fatal. 2 o
LIABILITY OF PRIOR EMPLOYERS
Another facet of the apportionment problem in cases of occupa-
tional disease and progressive aggravation of pre-existing disease is
allocating liability for compensation when the employee has worked
for several employers during the period of exposure. As has been
seen, a disease to be compensable must arise out of the employment,
but this does not mean that a particular employment must be the
sole proximate cause of the disease. As long as it substantially and
proximately contributes to the disease, the employer may be held
liable for the full disability attributable to the entire exposure. 2 '
It is not uncommon for a miner or a construction worker to
have worked for scores of different employers while developing an
occupational disease. The procedure for handling this type of case
was announced by the Supreme Court in Colonial Insurance Com-
pany v. Industrial Accident Commission... as follows:
We believe the more workable and fairer rule to be in progres-
sive occupational diseases, that the employee may, at his option,
obtain an award for the entire disability against any one or more of
successive employers or successive insurance carriers if the disease and
disability were contributed to by the employment furnished by the
employer chosen or during the period covered by the insurance even
though the particular employment is not the sole cause of the dis-
ability. To require an employee disabled with such a disease to fix upon
each of the carriers or employers the precise portion of the disability
attributable to its contribution to the cause of the malady is not in
consonance with the required liberal interpretation and application of
the workmen's compensation laws. The successive carriers or employers
should properly have the burden of adjusting the share that each should
bear and that should be done by them in an independent proceeding
between themselves. They are in a better position to produce evidence
on the subject and establish the proper apportionment. All of them may
have contributed to the disability and the employee should be permitted
to proceed against and have an award against any or all of them for the
whole disability if the evidence discloses that he was exposed to silica
dust during his period of employment with each of the employers
named.123
120 Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. I.A.C., 56 Cal. 2d 219, 14 Cal. Rptr. 548, 26
C.C.C. 130 (1961), where a non-industrial cancer was found to have been aggravated
by a fall. The employee would have died of the cancer within a year if there had been
no injury, but the employer was held liable for the entire death benefit.
121 Colonial Ins. Co. v. I.A.C., 29 Cal. 2d 79, 172 P.2d 884, 11 C.C.C. 226 (1946).
122 29 Cal. 2d 79, 172 P.2d 884, 11 C.C.C. 226 (1946).
123 Id. at 82, 172 P.2d at 886, 11 C.C.C. at 227.
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Since that case, an employee disabled as the result of an occu-
pational disease has had the right to proceed against any one or more
of his successive employers (or their insurance carriers) and obtain
an award against any or all of them for the whole disability.'24 In
1951 Section 5500.5 of the Labor Code was enacted to codify the
rule of the Colonial Insurance Company case... and to provide the
details for the trial of occupational disease cases.
The decision in Fireman's Fund Indemnity Co. v. Industrial
Accident Commission.26 specifically authorized the use of this pro-
cedure in cases where a pre-existing disease is aggravated by cumula-
tive exposures, and it is used by analogy in repetitive injury cases. 27
In this connection, there is an important difference between occupa-
tional disease cases and those involving aggravation of a pre-existing
disease. In the former, by definition, the disease did not exist before
the industrial exposure; 12 8 the exposure is peculiar to the occupa-
tion,'29 and there is no problem of apportionment except among the
successive employers or insurance carriers. 10 In the aggravation
cases, however, it is possible that the disease was causing some dis-
ability prior to the injury, that it is progressing apart from the effects
of the employment or that it is being aggravated by non-industrial
factors. It is not necessarily true in this type of case that the em-
ployee can recover for his whole disability against any employer who
contributed to the disability. The normal apportionment rules apply
where the work aggravates a pre-existing disease.''
A SOCIAL PROBLEM
The rules precluding apportionment in death cases and making
the employer fully liable for the aggravation by injury of a pre-
existing disease undoubtedly produce a socially desirable result in
individual cases. Whether this is equally true of their long range
effect is open to serious question.
The basic concept of workmen's compensation laws is to shift
124 Globe Ind. Co. v. I.A.C., 125 Cal. App. 2d 763, 271 P.2d 149, 19 C.C.C.
132 (1954).
125 Colonial Ins. Co. v. I.A.C., 29 Cal. 2d 79, 172 P.2d 884, 11 C.C.C. 226 (1945).
126 39 Cal. 2d 831, 250 P.2d 148, 17 C.C.C. 289 (1952).
127 Argonaut Ins. Co. v. I.A.C., 231 Cal. App. 2d 111, 41 Cal. Rptr. 628, 29
C.C.C. 279 (1964).
128 Colonial Ins. Co. v. I.A.C., 29 Cal. 2d 79, 172 P.2d 884, 11 C.C.C. 226 (1945).
129 Johnson v. I.A.C., 157 Cal. App. 2d 838, 321 P.2d 856, 23 C.C.C. 54 (1958).
150 Subsequent Injuries Fund v. I.A.C., 135 Cal. App. 2d 544, 288 P.2d 31, 20
C.C.C. 230, 233 (1955).




the major portion of the burden of industrial diseases and injuries
from the injured employees to industry and ultimately to the con-
sumer as a part of the cost of the product or service. 2 The em-
ployer's share of this burden is a substantial business expense. The
average workmen's compensation insurance premium cost in Cali-
fornia probably exceeds $1.75 per $100 of payroll."' In the more
hazardous industries the cost is substantially higher.' An employer
with a low loss record and a safe operation, however, may reduce
his compensation insurance costs by means of dividend plans, merit
rating and experience rating.'35
This possibility of reducing one cost of doing business provides
an important incentive for the employer to conduct his operations in
a manner calculated to minimize industrial injury, 3 ' but it also
makes him reluctant to hire employees with diseases likely to be
aggravated by injury or the occupational environment. Thus, people
with heart ailments or degenerative intervertebral disc disease are
frequently rejected in their search for employment, 37 and cost
conscious employers are often somewhat less than enthusiastic about
participating in "hire the handicapped" projects.
The obvious dilemma has been thoroughly debated and dis-
cussed, but a solution acceptable to both industry and labor has yet
to be proposed. 8 Until adequate remedial legislation is enacted,
the lawyer for an injured employee must be concerned not only with
securing an adequate award of compensation but also with advising
the client as to his vocational future.'8 9
CONCLUSION
In summary, the California workmen's compensation law pro-
vides general coverage for diseases arising out of the employment. An
employer, or his insurance carrier, is liable for any disease caused
or aggravated by the employment. He is not liable for pre-existing
132 CALIFORNIA CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, CALIFORNIA WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION PRACTICE 4 (1963).
183 REPORT OF THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION STUDY COMMISSION 52 (April
1965).
134 Id. at 47.
135 CALIFORNIA CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, CALIFORNIA WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION PRACTICE 477 (1963).
136 ABA, SECTION ON INSURANCE, NEGLIGENCE AND COMPENSATION LAW 132 (1965).
137 REPORT OF THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION STUDY COMMISSION 227 (April
1965).
188 Id. at 113-20.
189 CALIFORNIA CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, CALIFORNIA WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION PRACTICE 34-36, 52-54 (1963), for an excellent discussion of how this
responsibility can be discharged.
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disability nor for disability resulting from the normal progression
of a disease apart from the effects of the injury. In the case of
an occupational disease or aggravation of a disease by extended
exposure, the employee may recover for the entire industrial dis-
ability from any one or more successive employers or insurance car-
riers whose exposure contributed to the injury. The employers or
insurance carriers so held may seek apportionment and contribution
from the others in a supplemental proceeding.
The date of injury in occupational disease cases is the date
on which actual or imputed knowledge of the cause of the disease
coincides with disability. In other cases it is the date of the incident
or exposure causing or aggravating the disease. If the exposure
extends over a period of time, the last day of the exposure is the
date of injury.
The practical lawyer will keep these basic principles and their
various ramifications constantly in mind while preparing and trying
an industrial injury case involving disease. The more academically
inclined will look for clarification of the definitions of "disability"
and "occupational disease" from the Supreme Court but will not
anticipate any judicial modification of the basic rules.
The Legislature, on the other hand, will continue to be under
constant pressure to limit the rule that industry takes the employee
as it finds him. Statutory amendments authorizing employees with
pre-existing diseases to execute waivers, providing for apportionment
of liability on the basis of contributing causes, and establishing
guidelines limiting liability in disease cases will be proposed by
industry and opposed by labor. 4 ' The Legislature has thus far re-
jected numerous similar proposals, and it is doubtful that any major
changes will be made in the near future unless they are a part of a
major piece of legislation providing for the rehabilitation and re-
employment of injured employees.
140 REPORT OF THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION STUDY COMMISSION 113-20
(April 1965).
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